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A Positivist Approach to Pigouvian Taxes based on an Evolutionary Algorithm
1. Introduction
The Pigouvian tax is one of a class of taxes designed to mitigate against adverse
welfare affects of pollution from industrial processes.  It is distinguished from other
pollution taxes inasmuch as it is levied on industrial output rather than on
contaminants or effluent directly.  In conventional treatments, such as Randall (1987)
and Hartwick and Olewiler (1998) the Pigouvian tax, which may be fixed or ad-
valorum, is set equal to the marginal social cost of damage arising from pollution.
The tax allows polluting production to the point where the marginal benefits that it
confers on producers and users are equal to the marginal social costs of pollution.
Setting the tax at this level maximises welfare defined as the sum of producer and
consumer surpluses associated with the polluting production or, in multi-period
treatments, the discounted sum of these measures.  Baumol (1972) has shown that
providing markets are competitive, such taxes are allocatively efficient in the sense of
being Pareto Optimal.
In this study, we are interested in how Pigouvian taxes are likely to be set when
outcomes are uncertain.  For example, if the polluting industry is farming, future
prices and climate may be known only in terms of priors.  Similarly, uncertainty may
exist about social costs arising from pollution in the future.  This type of uncertainty
means setting the tax must be based on incomplete information and caution may be
appropriate.   In addition, our approach distinguishes between normative approaches
such as those cited above, which identify a policy ideal, and positivist approaches that
take into account government preferences.  The study is in the spirit of the political
economy literature from Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983) however both our
specification of government interest and solution technique, based on an evolutionary
algorithm, are new.
A model is constructed with two industries where one industry externalises some of
its costs onto the other.  Private management of the industries is assumed to be risk
neutral in the Subjective Expected Utility Model (SEUM) sense of constant marginal4
utility on the part of managers, however government policy makers are assumed to be
cautious, reflecting political concerns.  The solution involves setting the tax using an
evolutionary algorithm.  It is based on a relatively new theory of risk behaviour from
Szpiro (1997) and Cacho and Simmons (1999) where selection pressure, in our case
political pressure, provides a motivation for caution in decision making.
2. A Pigouvian Model
Two industries, A and B, have the following production functions:
a
A A ax y = (1)
a b
A B B cax bx y - = (2)
where  A y  and  B y are physical outputs and  A x and  B x  are composite factor inputs for
A and B respectively.   1 0 < <a ,  1 0 < < b  and a > 0, b > 0 and c > 0 with  c small
relative to a and b.  Output from A adversely affects output from B as a classical
production externality.
Equity markets are assumed to be complete and without transaction costs allowing
owners to diversify investment risk.  Hence managers, with access to complete
markets for investment risk, have constant marginal utility and are profit maximising
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where  A p  and  B p  are profits, 
1 u
Ae p  and 
2 u
Be p  are lognormally distributed output
prices,  A c  and  B c  are factor input prices for A and B respectively and  1 u  and  2 u  are
normally distributed independent random variables with  0 ) u , u ( Cov 2 1 = .5
First Order Conditions (FOC) are:
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The presence of the externality discourages production in industry B.  One way to
‘correct’ for the externality is to find the ‘Coasian market solution’.  That is, assume
both industries are owned by the same group and managed to maximise joint profits.
This provides incentives to mitigate against pollution from industry A, and because
the externalised cost is effectively internalised by re-arrangement of ownership, joint
profit from both industries is maximised.  This hypothetical situation gives the
maximum profit achievable from the joint resources in the industries and provides a6
benchmark level of possible joint profit for policy makers to aim for in setting a
pollution tax (Randall, 1987, p. 186-92).
If both industries are owned by the same group, the decision problem is:
B B A B
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with FOCs:
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Comparing (14) and (15) with (9) and (10) and noting a,b < 1, it follows  A y has
decreased and  B y has increased as a result of joint ownership.  The polluting industry
does less polluting and the polluted industry is less polluted.
The solution to the optimal tax based on the functional forms of the production
functions (1) and (2) is intractable using the usual solution technique based on FOC
with the tax as a policy variable.  However, an alternative approach is possible7
through the market solution described above.









where t is an ad valorem tax on output from industry A.  FOCs within the two
industries are obtained from (16) and (4):
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From a public policy perspective, assuming a dollar has the same value whether in
private or public domains, the welfare function is:
trev welfare B A + + = p p (19)






A ax e tp y e tp trev 1 1 = = (20)
The FOC for the policy decision, 
t d
welfare ¶
= 0, is a power function that cannot be
solved easily with (17) and (18) to obtain solutions to the optimal private decision
variables,  A x and  B x , and the policy variable, t.  To solve for t, compare FOC from
the market solution, (12) and (13), with FOC from the situation with the tax, (17) and




A e cp e tp = .  With identical FOC, the tax achieves the same outcome as the
market solution in terms of incentives facing the two managers.  It turns out that when




B =  the tax is equivalent to the market solution in terms of its impact8
on managers’ decision making.  Thus, the optimal tax level is a simple function of
relative prices prevailing between the industries.
To obtain a reduced form for the welfare function with t remaining exogenous, (17)
and (18) are solved simultaneously for  A x and  B x .   A x and  B x  are then substituted into
(20), (16) and (4) providing reduced forms for substitution into the three elements of
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Numerical Assumptions
The evolutionary algorithm is solved numerically hence assumptions about the values
of prices and coefficients are needed (Table 1).  Using values from Table 1, the




B = , indicates welfare is
maximised at t = 27 per cent when output prices are set at mean values.
Using mean values for prices and values from Table 1, the welfare function is plotted
against a range values for the tax in Figure 1.  Figure 1 reveals a relatively smooth,
convex surface (Figure 1).
3. Base Run for the Evolutionary Algorithm
Evolutionary algorithms have developed as a general research tool following early
work by Fogel, Owens and Walsh (1966), Holland (1975) and others with good
introductory texts being Goldberg (1989) and Mitchell (1997).  Specifications of
evolutionary algorithms vary between researchers and, arguably, there are as many
evolutionary algorithms as there are interested researchers with computer coding
skills.  The evolutionary algorithm used here was developed over a number of years to9
deal with problems in economic research.  These problems tended to be large in terms
of the number of coefficients to be estimated and often involved extracting signals
from noisy environments.  Two major constraints on development were the need to
avoid premature convergence in problems with weak signals and to limit computer
processing time needed to find solutions.  While there are many approaches to
specification of evolutionary algorithms most, but by no means all, involve the
following elements: initialisation, selection, pairing, crossing and mutation.  In
explaining how our evolutionary algorithm works, each of these elements is discussed
in the context of obtaining a baseline solution for the pollution tax problem.
The baseline solution provides a reference for later runs made under different
assumptions and allows a check against the theoretical result for the optimal tax
already obtained.  It is undertaken assuming output prices are fixed at their means as
with the analytical solution.
Initialisation
Initialisation is the seeding of the genesis population expected to evolve over the
course of estimation.  Forty random values for the tax, bounded below by zero to
exclude the possibility of a negative tax, and above by unity, are drawn from a
uniform distribution.  These are substituted into the function to be maximised,
equation (21), along with values from Table 1 with, as explained, prices held constant
for the base run.  Thus, forty random tax scenarios are generated and stored in a list.
Selection
In the selection stage, the objective function, (21), is solved for each random value of
the pollution tax generated in initialisation and results are ranked from the tax
scenario generating the highest welfare through to the tax scenario generating the
lowest welfare.  Highly ranked scenarios can be viewed as being ‘more fit’ and lower
ranked ones ‘less fit’.  Selection then occurs with the lowest ranked scenario being
dropped from the population leaving a population of 39.  Thus, selection pressure is
gentle with only a few per cent of the population being selected against in each10
generation.
Pairing
In the pairing stage, two scenarios are selected from the population to become pairs,
or ‘parents’, of ‘offspring’ in the new generation.  The first member of the pair is the
one with the tax scenario ranked most highly in welfare terms.  The second member
of the pair is chosen using a ‘roulette wheel’ technique similar to that described in
Goldberg (1987).  That is, the member is chosen randomly from the remaining 38
members of the population with more highly ranked scenarios having a greater
probability of being selected.  Thus, the first member of the pair is the most highly
ranked scenario and the second member can be any other scenario with the second
most highly ranked scenario having the highest probability of selection.  The list of
probabilities of selection as a mate are generated from the fitness rankings as the first
difference of a zero-one cumulative distribution for a list of consecutive numbers
corresponding in length to the size of the population minus one.
Crossing and mutation
 The pair ‘breeds’ in the sense that a new scenario is formed that has a tax level that is
a randomly weighted average of the tax levels of each member of the pair.  The
weights applied to each member’s tax level in forming this average are generated
from separate drawings from a uniform distribution with a range of 0.5 x – .  x can be
viewed as a ‘mutation’ that occurs in the averaging of parental characteristics and
means that offspring are not simple averages of parental pairs.  In this study, x was set
at 0.1.  The new ‘offspring’ resulting from this combining of parental characteristics is
added to the population restoring its size to forty.  When values of t in the new
generation were detected that violated 0 < t < 1, the tax was reset at either zero or one
depending whether the lower or upper bound had been violated.
This crossing technique is at variance with the genetic algorithm literature where
parental characteristics are combined using a technique called ‘bit string swapping’
described in Goldberg (1987) and Mitchell (1997).  ‘Bit string swapping’ is a more
complicated form of crossing than averaging.  It is based on an analogy to11
DNA splitting in haploid life-forms such as viruses.   Our own research began several
years ago with traditional genetic algorithms based on ‘bit string swapping’ however,
perhaps reflecting the types of problems that concerned us, we found superior results,
in terms of convergence characteristics and computer processing time, with the
numerical crossing approach described above.
Repeating the Loop
The new generation consists of 39 members from the preceding generation and one
new, hopefully ‘fitter’, member.  This generation then enters the cycle of selection,
pairing, crossing and mutation to create yet another generation.  The cycle is repeated,
in this case for 150 generations, until the value of the tax converges and no higher
level of welfare can be obtained.
The convergence path for welfare is reported in Figure 2 which shows the average
level of welfare achieved across the population each generation.  The convergence
path for the average level of the tax is reported in Figure 3.  It turned out that the
average value for the tax in generation 150 was 26.9 per cent, close to the
theoretically derived Pigouvian result of 27 per cent.  This result was expected since
suppression of noise in prices meant that the evolutionary algorithm was maximising
a simple deterministic function.
4.  Results with Stochastic Prices
In the base run reported above, output prices in each industry were set at their means.
This was relaxed by generating random lognormal distributions for prices based on
Table 1 values for  1 u  and  2 u .  The disturbances were incorporated into the algorithm
in the following manner.  Two lists of lognormally distributed random variables,
corresponding to 
1 u e  and 
2 u e  were created with the same length as the number of
generations in each run.  The first element in each list was set at the means of the
disturbances so that initialisation could occur at the mean.  Similarly, the last term in
each list was set to the mean so welfare achieved by the end of each run could be
monitored at mean price levels.  Each new generation, random terms from the list
were introduced so each member in each generation faced the same two random12
values for 
1 u e  and 
2 u e .  Thus, in generation one, each member’s welfare function was
calculated and ranked at the means, then in generation two, the two mean disturbance
terms were replaced with two new random terms, then in generation three, another
two new random terms were introduced and so on.
The experiment was conducted in three stages.  In the first stage, 
2 u e  was suppressed
by setting it to its mean value while 
1 u e  was stochastic.  In stage two, the opposite
occurred with 
1 u e  suppressed and 
2 u e  stochastic.  In stage three both 
1 u e  and 
2 u e  were
stochastic.  Hence, the affects of selection on setting the tax were measured in stage
one with noisy prices in the polluting industry, in stage two with noisy prices in the
polluted industry and in stage three with noisy prices in both industries
simultaneously.
Results from evolutionary algorithms usually converge however small differences
arise in results from repetitions of experiments because of the presence of random
mutations.  Thus, in these experiments, the algorithm was re-run ten times for
experimental stages one, two and three.  In fact, the results for the convergent levels
of the tax, reported for the ten repetitions in Table 2, were very similar for each stage.
Stage One Results
The running of the algorithm with a noisy stochastic term in the welfare function
required many more generations to extract the signal than with a deterministic
environment.  Hence, all three runs were 10,000 generations in length which may
have involved some harmless overkill.  In the first run, with noisy prices in the
polluting industry and fixed prices in the polluted industry, the value of the tax
averaged 43.7 per cent which is considerably higher than the level of the tax of 27 per
cent resulting from classical theory. This level of tax discriminates strongly against
the polluting industry reflecting that prices in that industry are the only source of
noise in the model.  The path over which convergence occurred in the first run is
shown in Figure 4.13
Stage Two Results
In stage two, noise in the polluting industry price was suppressed and the sole source
of noise was output price in the polluted industry.  This resulted in an average tax
level of 16.6 per cent over the ten repetitions, well below the level for the classical
model of 27 per cent.  Thus, the government was less protective of the polluting
industry when it was making a relatively noisy contribution to welfare.  The welfare
stream is safer in terms of government’s political survival when stable returns from
industry A are emphasised over unstable returns from the polluted industry B.
Stage Three Results
Both industries contributed the same amount of noise in the welfare function in stage
three with noisy output prices in both A and B.  The resulting average tax level of 27
per cent was the same as for the classical treatment of the tax from Pigou.  In this
situation, the government has nothing to gain from favouring, or discriminating
against, either industry in terms of stabilising welfare.
Discussion and Conclusions
The approach taken to management of risk in this study is from Szpiro (1997) and
Cacho and Simmons (1999).  It is based on quite different assumptions to von
Neuman and Morgenstern’s (1947) Subjective Expected Utility Model (SEUM) which
is usually encountered in economic treatments of risk.  However, our qualitative
conclusion that setting of the tax discriminates against the industry which contributes
most to noise in the welfare function is consistent with an SEUM treatment of the
problem.  For example, if welfare in the theoretical model was specified as
Log(welfare) and government assumed to be altruistic, hence ascribing Diminishing
Marginal Utility (DMU) to government in its approach to welfare, similar qualitative
results would have been obtained to those obtained with the evolutionary algorithm.
That is, the solution would have discriminated against the relatively noisy industry
and the deterministic Pigouvian solution would have been recovered when noise was
symmetrically distributed between the industries.  Similarly a ‘market solution’ where
the joint owners of the two industries were assumed to have DMU rather than being14
risk neutral would have discriminated against noise and also recovered the Pigouvian
solution with symmetrical noise.
Yet, despite the similarities in qualitative results, the two theories, SEUM and ours,
are fundamentally different. The central assumption in SEUM is that agents have
DMU in either income or wealth.  The assumption of DMU means that agents place
relatively less value on marginal income when income is relatively high and hence
sacrifice little, in utility terms, by undertaking saving or reducing debt.  Conversely,
when low-income states are encountered, marginal dollars are valued relatively highly
in utility terms and borrowing and dis-saving become attractive.  This means agents
have incentives in expected utility terms for stabilising incomes and, in the framework
of SEUM, results in powerful and generally robust theories about how government
should deal with uncertainty.
With the evolutionary algorithm, policy engendered stability occurs for different
reasons to SEUM approaches. Government wishes to set the tax to generate the
highest possible level of welfare however it is faced with a probabilistic game because
of the stochastic prices in the model.  If prices in, say, the polluting industry are high
relative to those in the polluted industry, then a low tax is appropriate to maximise
welfare.  However, if conditions change and the polluting industry price falls relative
to the polluted industry price, then the high tax becomes welfare reducing and a
political liability.  Hence, government attempts to find a balance between possible
outcomes that minimises the possibility of being ‘caught’ with the ‘wrong’ policy
settings.
Despite the apparent observational equivalence in qualitative outcomes from the two
approaches to risk, it is possible results from strategic models such as ours are
intrinsically different to those from SEUM analyses in terms of their allocative
efficiency.  Some hint of this comes from Cacho and Simmons’ (1999) use of the
Separation Theorem in their strategic model of farm investment under uncertainty.
They showed that ‘strategic’ farms, faced with selection pressure from the possibility
of bankruptcy, are likely to operate below their risk-efficient frontiers and hence not
Pareto Optimal.  That is, when farm investments reflected fear of bankruptcy, risk-
return outcomes could be dominated. There were potential strategies with15
higher expected returns and the same uncertainty or reduced uncertainty with the
same expected return than those strategies predicted by the model.  Thus, caution was
associated with a degree of inefficiency in the Pareto sense.  In our study, the recovery
of the original Pigouvian solution when uncertainty is symmetrical between the two
industries indicates Pareto optimality can occur in these types of models.  However, it
is less clear whether the same result would prevail in stages one and two with
asymmetric disturbances.  This means that political pressure on government to
perform in terms of welfare may lead to inefficient outcomes in terms of resource
allocation in setting of pollution taxes.  Doing the best by the community in terms of
maximising welfare may not be the best political strategy.  If the assumptions of our
model are considered, with welfare being largely comprised of profits accruing to risk
neutral owners, the government’s preferred tax levels are clearly inappropriate except
in the case where noise was symmetrical.  Hence, a strong conclusion from this study
is that a politically ‘pressured’ government may not provide the best policy settings
for a pollution tax.16
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1 u N(0, 1)
2 u N(0, 1)
Table 1: Numerical Assumptions for Coefficients and Prices18
Run # Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
1 0.436 0.162 0.268
2 0.449 0.161 0.276
3 0.452 0.175 0.263
4 0.456 0.165 0.284
5 0.442 0.166 0.276
6 0.419 0.156 0.248
7 0.407 0.163 0.289
8 0.441 0.173 0.269
9 0.436 0.165 0.261
10 0.429 0.173 0.267
Mean 0.437 0.166 0.270
Standard Error 0.015 0.006 0.012
Table 2: Results for the Tax over Ten Repetitions19









Figure 1: Plot of Welfare Against the Tax.20








Figure 2: Convergence Path for Welfare over 150 Generations21








Figure 3: Convergence Path for the Tax over 150 Generations
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Figure 4: Convergence Path for Tax when Polluter’s Price is Noisy